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Abstract: This study describe an experiment on individual learning in the 
domain of cognitive economics. The authors’ main goal is to observe and to 
describe how subjects elaborate rules and regularities in problem solving. 
Involved subjects are asked to choose between different scores related to an 
evaluation of some hypothetical exams. The game is repeated a wide number 
of times, sufficient to permit the emergence of accurately observable results. 
A particular software has been developed to support the experiment. 
Results seem to show that subjects elaborate coherent rules in a path-
dependent way; they manifest a tendency to consolidate these rules also when 
they are aware that they are wrong; and, at the same time, they exhibit an 
opposite predisposition not to confirm some rights rules. 
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Since economic analysis does not deal with omniscient and perfectly rational 
agents as actors of social phenomena, the comprehension of the role of 
individual learning in decision making is now considered more and more 
important in explaining how people choose. Nevertheless, economists tend to 
use analytical concepts such as learning, which are traditionally pertinent to 
other disciplines, such as psychology, in a very superficial way. Though this is 
true in particular for traditional economists
2, it should be noted that the 
                                        
1 The experiment here presented has been realized at the Centre for Cognitive 
Economics of the Università del Piemonte Orientale in Alssandria, Italy. The authors 
are grateful to the staff of the Centre and in particular to Chiara Antonello, Simona 
Mazzarello, Elena Passalacqua and Cesare Tibaldeschi. We have presented a previous 
versions of this paper at the Workshop on Cognitive Economics (November 2000) held 
in Alessandria and Torino, at the workshop on Simulation in Economics with Artificial 
and Real Agents (June 2001) held in Torino and in an invited seminar at the Creuset, 
University of St. Etienne (July 2001). We thank all the participants in the discussion 
during the workshops and seminar and in particular for their comments Michel Bellet, 
Massimo Egidi, Pierre Garrouste and Pietro Terna. The authors are very grateful to the 
Società per l’insediamento universitario per Alessandria – Asti which has partially 
supported this research. 
2 As Börgers wrote (1996, p. 1384) the reason might be that “economists naturally do 
not welcome research which calls into question the foundations of their work”. To multifarious panorama of contemporary economics presents a heterogeneity of 
positions. 
A recent and widespread tendency among economists is proposing, in fact, an 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of human behavior emerging at the 
crossroads of the heterodox tradition in economics and cognitive sciences, and 
it has given birth to a new branch of economics, i.e. cognitive economics, as it 
has recently been named
3. This paper aims at belonging to this branch. 
Though there is no doubt that the analytical novelties proposed by this new 
approach are relevant and concern all aspects of economic analysis and 
method, we will focus here our attention only on the theme of this paper: the 
role of human learning in problem solving. Literature distinguishes two 
different kinds of learning: learning from direct experience (learning by doing, 
learning by using) and vicarious learning (learning by the observation of 
others
4). This paper deals with the former. 
We decided therefore to turn to that particular field of research of cognitive 
economics, experimental economics, whose interest in learning is increasing. 
In particular we are referring to that specific sector of experimental 
economics, devoted to the experiments on individual and organizational 
learning (Novarese – Rizzello 1999). 
Our starting point concerns what happens when individuals face a problematic 
situation under bounded information, i.e. one of the most widespread 
conditions in economics, in which people act when it is not possible to use 
routines that have already been experimented in similar circumstances.  
We can note that, when these conditions recur, a lot of psycho-neurobiological 
processes, deeply illustrated elsewhere (Rizzello 1999), are spontaneously 
activated to help individuals to decide. First of all, a process of representation 
and framing of the problematic situation is activated, which depends on both 
the subjective mental structures and on the individual’s previous experience. 
Psychology gives evidence that this process of framing is incomplete. This is 
due to an economic cognitive activity of the mind and to its use of shortcuts to 
reduce complexity. As maintained in previous works, it is reasonable to think 
that these mechanisms of human reasoning and learning are differentiated
5 
from one individual to another, just like the perception of external data, on 
which they strongly depend
6. 
Generally speaking, learning can be defined as the human capacity to modify 
behavior in a more or less permanent way, whenever new experience is 
acquired. Cognitive psychology furthermore specifies that this ability depends 
on the subjective cognition of the environment (it is linked to perception and 
the process of mental imagination) and on how this cognition affects behavior 
(Droz, 1977). 
These specific characteristics of human cognition and the link between 
previous experience and perception make room for the further hypothesis that 
                                                                                                                     
support the idea of a superficial use of psychological concepts we may refer to Piaget’s 
opinion that unfortunately for psychology all think to be psychologists (1979, p. 28). 
3 For the foundations and the historical evolution of the cognitive approach to 
economics see Egidi-Rizzello (2002), and for the characteristics of cognitive economics 
see Rizzello (1999). 
4 The theory of social cognitive learning, based on vicarious learning, has been 
elaborated by the Canadian psychologist Albert Bandura, but it still little widespread 
among economists. A few exceptions are: Witt (2000) and Rizzello-Turvani (2002). 
5 Rizzello (2000a, and 2000b). 
6 Hayek 1952 deeply illustrated these mechanisms, later confirmed by psychology and 
neurobiology (see Rizzello 1999). learning happens in path-dependent terms (Rizzello, 1997 and 2000a: Egidi-
Narduzzo, 1997).  
With these two simple hypotheses about human learning, (differentiation and 
path-dependence) we designed an experiment to observe individuals in 
laboratory and to describe their behavior in a decision making context. 
Obviously, our aim is also to try to explain how they produce rules and 
regularities in behavior, and why they consolidate them also when they appear 
not to be correct.  
Usually, experimental economics tends to test strong theories by building 
simple contexts. This is not our goal. Our attention is devoted to the 
comprehension of the nature and functioning of learning. Then, it is principally 
dedicated to the process, not only to the outcomes of a learning process, as 
happens in a great part of experimental literature on learning
7.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II illustrates the characteristics of 
the experiment. Section III presents the detailed results. Section IV offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The experiment 
 
Subjects were given the following instructions: 
 
- A subject has to take a series of exams. Each of these exams should be 
evaluated as: very good, good, middle, bad, very bad. If the subject scores 
very good or good, he’ll pass the exam. If he scores bad or very bad he will 
not pass the exam. If he score middle he will have to repeat the exam. 
Each exam is evaluated with a new system of score; it receives: 
- a colour (black, blue, white or yellow) 
- a shape (heart, circle, square or rectangle) 
- a dimension (big or small) 
Then, for example, an exam could be evaluated as blue - heart - small 
- The connection between shapes-colours-dimensions and the final result of 
the exam is not known 
 
Then the game worked in this way: 
- the subject was presented the first combination of shape-colour-dimension, 
- he had to choose one of the possible scores, 
- he was informed whether his answer is right or not and which is the right 
solution; 
- he was presented another combination  
- and so on for 231 rounds. 
 
A specific software was realised to perform the experiment. Figure 1 shows the 
main screen presented to the players. 
 
According to their answers, subjects were given points, later converted into 
credits for the exam (therefore students had a strong motivation to do their 
best). We will discuss these point later. 
                                        
7 In “diagnostical task experiments” (see for example Kelley and Friedman, 1999; 
Kitzis et al, 1998; and the related theoretical work of Marcet and Sargent, 1989) 
which present a few similarities with the experiment here described, the authors’ 
attention is focused on the subjects’ ability to correctly estimate the parameters of a 
known model.  
Figure 1. The screen presented to the players 
 
 
Between the combinations of information and the right answer there is a 
logical relation, stable for all rounds, described in Table 1
8. 
 
Table 1. Logical relation between combinations and results 
Score colour  shape Dimension 
very  good  bright (white and 
yellow) 
not angular shapes 
(circle and heart) 
Big 
good  bright (white and 
yellow) 
not angular shapes 
(circle and heart) 
Small 
dark (black and blue)  not  angular  shapes 
(circle and heart) 
middle 




small or big 
bad  dark (black and blue)  angular  shapes 
(square and rectangle)
Small 




The data gathered with this experiment enable to link choices and available 
information and to observe possible changes in the behavior of the players 
during the game. Such possibile changes are obviously the effect of learning 
processes. 
 
At the beginning of the game, players don't know the relation between 
information and result. So they have to find and learn it. 
As the game is based on a relatively small number of different sequences of 
information (there are 4*4*2=32 different combinations of shapes-colours-
dimensions and the same combination appears many times during the game), 
subjects might try to remember them. In this case, the results of the 
experiment, would probably be less interesting (i.e. more artificious and 
conditioned by the experimental setting). Therefore subjects were not 
explicitly told that there were fixed and repeated sequences (while they were 
informed of the logical relation between information and results), and, as their 
mathematical skills are low, they could hardly be able to understand it before 
the game (this idea is supported by the answers given in the post-experiment 
survey). Besides, remembering 32 sequences is not so easy. Then subjects 
are expected to try to understand the game instead of learning single answers 
by heart. 
                                        
8 The categories of color and shape are not explicitly used in the description of the 
game given to players.  
3. Results 
 
The experiment were realised in Alessandria in October 2000. Sixty-four 
subjects (students in Law, with no Economics back-ground) participated
9. 
The length of the experiments was between thirty minutes and one hour. 
Subjects were arranged in different rooms, with no possibility to communicate 
during the experiment. 
 
The main results are presented in the following sections. 
 
Tendency to develop rules 
 
As said, a single combination of shape-colour-dimension appears many times 
during the game (never in two rounds running). 
By taking into account all the answers a subject gives to a given combination 
during the game, we can count the number of wrong answers he gives and the 
number of times wrong choices are confirmed. 
 
Table 2. Answers given by Player 1 to some combinations 
Round colour shape  Dimension  correct  result 
subject’s 
result 
9  yellow  Rectangle Big  Middle Middle 
16  yellow  Square Small  Middle  Good 
33  yellow  Square Small  Middle  Good 
43  yellow  Rectangle Big  Middle  Very  good 
50  yellow  Square Small  Middle  Good 
60  yellow  Rectangle Big  Middle  Very  good 
67  yellow  Square Small  Middle  Good 
 
For example, the sequence yellow-square-small (bold type in table 2) appears 
four times in the part of game reported in table 2. One of the participants in 
the experiment (name him/her player 1) confirms the same wrong answer 
after the three errors in the table. Then, we can say that he confirms 3 errors 
after 3 wrong choices (100% of confirmation). It’s possible to count a similar 
rate for all the combinations (and for the whole game) of the same player and 
to build a mean value. 
The distribution of these values between all players is shown in table 3. 
 






 64  players
 
Thus the tendency to confirm wrong choices is quite generalised among 
subjects. In many cases they understand the right choice after confirming the 
                                        
9 Similar results were obtained in a pilot experiment realized in March 2000 in 
Alessandria with a smaller group of subjects remunerated with money. wrong one. Sometimes they never understand it, and confirm the wrong 
answer till the end of the game. 
We might explain this event through the subjects’ bad memory, thus wrong 
choices would be the result of a random process. This hypothesis has been 
verified and rejected with a statistical test (99% of significance) for most of 
the subjects (47 out of 64)
10. 
 
Table 2 also shows the sequence yellow-rectangle-big. At its first appearance, 
player 1 gives a right answer (round 9) but at the following one he gives a 
wrong one. Then we can say that (at round 43) he doesn't confirm a right 
solution. 
Many other players show a similar behavior. There are players who give a 
right answer to the same sequence for a number of rounds (at least two in the 
data shown in table 4)
11 and then change it till the end of the game. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of the number of right answers given at least two times 
and then no longer confirmed  













The results we have shown regard the whole game, from the very beginning. 
It is also necessary to concentrate on the last part of the game, to see if 
players tend to develop regularities of behavior and if they understand the 
rationale of the game. 
As a first step, it is necessary to give a definition of rule (specific for this 
experiment). Let us take into account the third part of the game (the last 77 
rounds), where many sequences appear 3 or 4 times. 
For each sequence we can count how many times a subject gives the same 
(right or wrong) answer: 
- "rule 75" means that the subject gives the same answer 75% of the times; 
- "rule 100%" means that the subject gives the same answer 100% of the 
times. 
 
The idea is that if a player gives always or almost always the same answer 
when faced with the same sequence, he has probably developed a kind of 
routine
12. 
                                        
10 The probability of confirming by chance n wrong answers on m confirmations is 
equal to the probability of n successes in m independent repetitions in a binomial 
casual variable with probability equal to 1/5. 
11 As the same right answer is given at least in two following appearance of the same 
sequence, it is unlikely that they are given just by chance. 
12 As the game is very long and repetitive, it seems reasonable to think that a subject 
who has developed a rule can make a mistake and give, in some cases, a different  
Table 5 reports the distribution of the percentage of "rule 75" developed by 
the players on all the sequences appearing at least 4 times during the whole 
game (later we will analyse some of the sequences that appear only few 
times). The table shows that there is a wide heterogeneity among players, but 
that most of them seem to have developed a very routinised behavior. 
 
Table 5 Distribution of the percentage of rules developed by players 








While there are 22 subjects who develop only right rules (table 6), there are 
also many players who develop a significant percentage (15% or 16%) of 
wrong rules. Then routinization does not mean that subjects have understood 
the right rules. In other words, not all the rules developed by the subjects are 
right. 
 
Table 6 Percentage of rules (total and wrong) developed by players, 
mean values* 
  rule 75 Rule 100
total percentage of rules developed  75% 70%
percentage of wrong rules developed  16% 15%
Values are computed only for the sequences that appear at least 4 times during the 
whole game 
 
It is now useful to focus our attention on the behavior of player 1. We have 
seen that he confirms several times the wrong answer “good” for the sequence 
yellow-square-small, while he does not confirm the right answer to the 
sequence yellow-rectangle-big. Table 6 helps us to understand the reason for 
this apparently strange behavior, and to link it to the development of rules in 
the last period by the same subject. This table reports for the first 77 rounds 
(period I) and for the last 77 ones (period III) the answer given to each 
sequence. For example, in the first period, the subject answers in all cases 
(100%) "very good" to the sequence yellow-circle big. This sequence appears 
3 times in the period (as we can see in the last column, where freq=3). The 
coloured cells indicates the right answer. 
This table suggests the reason for the exemplified errors of this player. The 
answer "good" (confirmed though it is wrong) to the sequence yellow-square-
small is coherent with the routines developed (from the very beginning) for 
the sequences yellow-circle/heart-small. The right answer (not confirmed) 
"middle" for the sequence yellow-rectangle-big is not coherent with the others 
and with the system of rules emerging in the final part of the game, in which 
"square" and "rectangle" are compared to "circle" and "heart". The system of 
                                                                                                                     
answer. Moreover, the rule could be in evolution and not perfectly defined at the 
beginning of what we define third period. That is the reason why we also use a 
definition like "rule 75". rules developed (also the part which is not shown here) is then wrong but it 
seems to be coherent. 
This is only one example, yet similar results can be found for other players 
(see also, for example, table 10 below). 
 
Table 6 A more detailed analysis of the behavior of Player 1 
period Colour  Shape  dim.  Very bad Bad Middle  Good  Very  Good  freq 
I  yellow  circle  big              100%  3 
       small           100%     5 
    heart  big              100%  2 
       small           80%  20% 5 
    square  big                 0 
       small           100%     4 
   rectangle  big          50%     50%  4 
       small                 0 
III  yellow  circle  big              100%  3 
       small           100%     4 
    heart  big              100%  1 
       small           100%     3 
    square  big              100%  1 
       small           100%     4 
    rectangle  big              100%  3 
       small           100%     1 
 
Answers to the new sequences 
 
An interesting question is related to the features of the rules developed and to 
the way subjects build them. 
Do subjects build broader categories starting form available information? A 
different way of stating the problem is: do subjects extend the domain of 
validity of rules beyond the field in which they were developed and tested? 
The extension of the validity of a rule is obviously dependent on the process of 
abstraction. 
As said, in the last rounds of the game eight new sequences, never presented 
before, are proposed to the players. Surely, they cannot remember the right 
solutions for them. A right answer to (most or all of) them, can then be taken 
as evidence that players have understood the rationale of the game, and also 
that they have created categories
13. Table 7 shows the distribution of right 
answers to the new sequences. 
 
25 players gave a right answer to all the new sequences and many others 
answered correctly to many new sequences. The mean time used to give an 
answer in the cases under exam is equal to about 5.8 seconds (a very short 
time as compared to that used to answer to the first new sequences at the 
beginning of the game, which was equal to 12.8 seconds). 
These players are not just remembering answers by heart, but they are able 
to extend the domain of validity of rules correctly. Yet, some results presented 
in the previous section seem to suggest that sometimes rules are also applied 
                                        
13 This hypothesis could be tested, in other ways, with the data of this experiment. 
Table 7 is also an evidence that at least a few players are not just memorizing the 
answers. in a less appropriated way, and that wrong categories are build up. We can 
see this fact with another example. 
 
Table 7 distribution of right answers to the new sequences in the last 
part of the game 











The new sequences presented in the last part of the game are: white-heart-
small, white-square-small, blue-circle-big, blue-heart-small, yellow-square-
big, yellow-rectangle-small, black-circle-big, black-heart-small 
For each of them, let us take into account one of the most similar sequences, 
the one with the same dimension and shape but with a different colour: yellow 
instead of "white" (and viceversa), "blue" instead of "black" (and viceversa). 
The similar sequences are then respectively: yellow-heart-small, yellow -
square-small, black-circle-big, black -heart-small, white-square-big, white -
rectangle-small, blue-circle-big, blue -heart-small
14. 
 
Now, let us restrict our attention to these similar sequences and take into 
account those in which subjects have developed a wrong "rule 75" (i.e. they 
have answered in at least 75% of case in the same wrong way). Table 8 
shows the distribution of the number of wrong answers to the new sequences 
that are identical to those given to the similar ones (for which subjects have 
developed a "rule 75"). 
In other words, for example, 10 players developed wrong "rules 75" for the 
sequence white-square-big
15. Imagine that they answer "very good" - and not 
"middle" - in at least 75% of the times they meet this sequence. 3 of them 
declare "very good" even when faced with the sequence yellow-square-big. It 
is possible to make a similar test for all the sequences and count the number 
of identical answers.  
Between the groups of the so called "new sequences" and that of the so called 
"similar sequences" there are common elements (blue-circle-big is the "similar 
sequence" of black-circle-big and viceversa, and the same for blue-heart small 
and black-heart-small). They are then considered only once (so the total 
number of new sequences is 6).  
 
                                        
14 It seems reasonable to think that a player can build a similarity between these 
kinds of sequences as the similarities are suggested by the game itself. There are yet 
other possible and reasonable similarities (for example sequences with the same color 
and dimension, and with similar shape, or sequences with the same color and shape 
and different dimension …). So the test presented here is necessarily very partial and 
only aims at giving an idea of the process of extension of rules. 
15 It is not possible to give here a detailed account of the complete distribution of this 
values. Table 8. Number of wrong answers identical to those of the similar 
sequence 
number of wrong answers identical to those 









There is one player who apparently "transfers" 5 wrong rules to the new 
sequences; another one (name him player 2) seems to transfer 4 of them, and 
so on. It is important to stress that this test is only a way to show - from a 
different point of view and for more players - a fact that has already been 
perceived elsewhere. 
 
Table 9 A more detailed analysis of the behavior of Player 2 
period        Very bad bad  middle  Good  very good  freq 
III  White  circle  Big              100%  4 
        small           100%     3 
     heart  Big              100%  4 
        small           100%     1 
     square  Big              100%  3 
        small           100%     1 
     rectangle  Big        100%        1 
        small        100%        3 
   Blue circle  Big  100%               1 
        small     100%           2 
     heart  Big  33%     67%        3 
        small     100%           1 
     square  Big  75%     25%        4 
        small     100%           1 
     rectangle  Big  100%              1 
        small     100%           4 
   yellow  circle  Big              100%  3 
        small           100%     4 
     heart  Big              100%  1 
        small           100%     3 
     square  Big              100%  1 
        small           100%     4 
     rectangle  Big        100%        3 
        small        100%        1 
   black circle  Big  100%               1 
        small     100%           2 
      heart Big 100%               2 
        small     100%           1 
     square  Big  100%              3 
        small     50%  50%        4 
     rectangle  Big  100%              3 
        small     100%           4 
 Table 8 shows that some players give the same answer to many different but 
similar sequences. There are relatively few players "transferring" many wrong 
rules, but we are analysing only one of the possible similar rules. Certainly the 
fact that some players give the same answer is not a definite proof of the 
transfer of rules (or of the building of higher-level categories). These could be 
just random results but probably, for some players it is not so. A random 
similarity among 5 or 4 answers has a very low probability. A detailed analysis 
of players’ behavior support the idea that these are not random results. 
Table 10 shows the last part of player 2’s game. As we can see, he has 
developed a "rule 75" that says: white-square-small=very good. He replies 
"very good" also to the sequence yellow-square-small. He might do so by 
chance, but this answer is coherent with his overall system of rules. In fact he 
compares "square" to "circle" and "heart" for all colours. 
 
Similar analyses could be done for all sequences (not only for the new ones) 
and using other "similar rules" (in fact subjects could build other kinds of 
categories). Other example of transferring of rules would probably emerge. 
 
The effect of the systems of compensation 
 
Points were assigned to subjects according to two different systems (table 10) 
The first one tends to give a high reward to right answers, while very wrong 
answers are strongly penalised. Not-too-wrong answers receive an almost null 
reward. The second system of remuneration has a low variance of points 
between right and wrong answers. 
 
Table 10. Systems of Compensation 
distance from the right 
solution* 
points gained - case 1 points gained – case 2
0 - right answer  +10  +6 
1 +2  +3 
2 0  +1 
3 -2  0 
4 -10  -1 
*for example if the right answer is very good and the answer is very bad, the distance 
is 4; if the right answer is very good and the answer is good, the distance is 1 
 
The two systems seem to have a strong effects on players' learning processes. 
Results are partly unexpected: the players in group 1 tend to develop a lower 
number of rules and a higher ratio of wrong rules (table 11). 
 
Table 11. Mean values of many indicators by system of compensation 
  group 1  group 2
right answer by subject  137  158
Percentage of "rules 75"  0,74  0,81
Percentage of "rules 100"  0,65  0,76
Percentage of wrong rules on rules 100  0,18  0,10
Percentage of wrong rules on rules 75  0,19  0,12
 
Because of the limits of a single article, it is not possible to discuss here the 
results in detail. However, it seems necessary to stress that these results 
highlight again that individual learning is not a process converging necessarily towards a predefined path (leading necessarily to the “best rule”). 
Environment and context (in this case the system of compensation) seem in 
fact to have a strong effect, and they can influence the direction of the 
process. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Though the emergence of routines and regularities in human decision making 
and the role played by learning are widely acknowledged in literature, some 
relevant problems are still open in economics. Among these, we decided to 
focus our attention on the crucial question “how do rules consolidate after they 
emerge?”. We are aware that finding a satisfying answer to this question is a 
very hard task, which should at the same time include both an individual and a 
social level of analysis (concerning individual and vicarious learning). There is 
no doubt also about the fact that, besides decision making, this open question 
is particular relevant to a very large spectrum of economic tradition, including 
Austrian economics, evolutionary economics, economics of innovation and new 
institutional economics.  
After previous investigations on the theoretical and methodological grounds 
(see in particular Rizzello, 1999, and Novarese-Rizzello, 1999), we are now 
convinced that only the experimental domain will help us point towards a 
solution, by observing and describing human learning. As accurate 
observations can be made only step by step, the above illustrated experiment 
referred only to a first step. Authors’ intention is to build new experiments 
soon, also on vicarious learning and co-ordination, and then to cluster all 
these results. 
What has emerged up to now encourages us to continue this research on this 
specific branch of cognitive and experimental economics. This paper seems to 
suggest in fact to the above question “how do rules consolidate after they 
emerged?” at least a few answers.  
If, on the one hand, results seem to confirm what is already largely known in 
literature (i.e.:individuals spontaneously tend to generate new rules in 
decision making, when they cannot use preexisting routines), on the other 
hand, more interesting, it has also emerged that individuals manifest a 
tendency to consolidate such regularities also when they are aware that these 
rules are wrong. At the same time, they exhibit an opposite predisposition not 
to confirm some rights rules. This appears to us as an important outcome and 
though we can correctly affirm that this last aspect cannot be still generalized, 
from a detailed analysis (a kind of case study) of the results of at least a few 
of the players emerge that "the strategy's rules have to be memorized and 
represented with some degree of abstraction, to allow one drastically to 
reduce their number. Raising the level of abstraction with which a strategy's 
rule is represented, means to extend the domain of validity of the rule beyond 
the field in which the rule has been experimented, and it may therefore induce 
one to include inadvertently domains in which the rule is inefficient" (Egidi 
2000).  
As seen, besides, rules developed by the players in exam seem to be 
coherent. They are not perfectly correct, but they are satisficing, also in the 
sense that they are easy to remember and apply. 
Finally, one could contend that the fact that the results are not readable in a 
general and comprehensive way is an insurmountable limit towards the 
development of a robust model, and it would correctly suggest to abandon this 
research. This is not the case. When the goal is to “observe and describe” and not to confute or validate a model, it is right to take into account also 
behaviors which in this phase could seem performances of niche and in a 
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